Kaduna seized, Lagos wired, AKK stalled: one grid, three realities
NERC dissolved Kaduna DisCo's board on 10 August, installing an interim administrator after the company accumulated ₦456.5 billion in market obligations, posted ATC&C losses of 71.9% and remitted just 41.9% of invoiced amounts in 2025 (Vanguard).
This is the second regulatory takeover in 30 months, after ASI Engineering assumed control in June 2024 and added ₦118.6 billion in fresh debt.
Nine days later, TCN commissioned 672 MW of new transmission capacity across four Lagos substations, including World Bank-funded Alausa and Ijora and the ₦20 billion JICA-supported Apapa substation (Vanguard).
Lagos already hosts the two best-performing DisCos. The grid can now carry more power to the customers most likely to pay for it.
AKK, the $2.8 billion gas pipeline that was supposed to deliver first gas in July, has delivered nothing.
Construction hit 94% completion, but terminal facilities remain unfinished and NNPC's latest estimate is "tentatively September 2026" (Daily Trust). The pipeline has missed deadlines in 2023, 2024, 2025 and now 2026.
On 23 August, generation plunged to 1,132 MW at 8:30pm. Twelve generating plants recorded zero output at once. The grid clawed back to 1,793 MW by 9pm (ThisDay).
Read these together. Lagos gets more wire and it will use it productively, because Ikeja and Eko collect.
Kaduna gets a second regulator-appointed board and it may not matter, because the underlying commercial failure has survived one intervention already. AKK gets built but produces no gas. The grid has capacity it cannot deliver.
Three readers, three different problems
If you operate in Lagos, reliability may improve marginally as TCN's new substations reduce distribution-level congestion. If you operate in Kaduna, Kano or Jos, assume no change to supply quality through 2027. Size your backup generation on current grid performance, not pipeline promises.
Kaduna's second takeover proves that swapping management without restructuring the commercial model does not work. The ₦118.6 billion in additional debt accumulated under the first intervention is the evidence.
If the Afreximbank-led investor search does not produce a capitalized buyer within 12 months, the cycle repeats.
Lagos distribution assets are performing at near-commercial levels: Ikeja's 97.3% collection efficiency in May is investable by most DFI standards. Northern DisCos remain uninvestable until metering crosses 60% penetration and ATC&C falls below 40%. The gap between Lagos and Kaduna is widening, not closing.
Nigeria's power sector is splitting into two countries. Lagos, with its new transmission capacity and its two best-collecting DisCos, is approaching a system that works.
Kaduna, with 71.9% losses and a regulator on its second intervention, is approaching a system that cannot be saved by regulatory action alone.
The metric that settles it: whether collection efficiency in Kaduna rises above 55% under the new administrator by Q1 2027. If it does not, privatization has failed in the north and a different model is needed.
Plain English first
When this page says "collection efficiency," it means the share of the money a DisCo bills that it actually receives. At 82.32% nationally, DisCos lose roughly ₦18 of every ₦100 they invoice.
In Kaduna, the figure is closer to ₦58 lost. The gap between billing and collection is the gap between a power sector that can fund itself and one that cannot.
The motorway analogy
Nigeria's grid is a 13-lane motorway with 4 lanes open. Installed capacity is 13,625 MW. Available capacity is 4,286 MW. The other 9 lanes are closed by gas shortages, maintenance backlogs and ageing plant.
Adding transmission capacity, as Lagos did on 19 August, is widening an on-ramp. It helps, but only if the motorway lanes behind it are open.
